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The Coverage of Title I of ERISA:
Some Recent Developments
I. INTRODUCTION
Employee benefit plans have a significant and growing impact
on the population of the United States. It is estimated that
nonfederal retirement funds currently hold in excess of $750 billion
in assets.' Total retirement, disability, and survivor benefits in-
creased from two percent of the gross national product in 1950 to
over eight percent in 1975.2 Benefit plans and their administration
materially affect the capital markets, the development of industrial
relations, the stability of employment, and the well being of mil-
lions of employees and their dependents.3
Prior to 1974, federal regulation regarding benefit plans was
somewhat piecemeal and was primarily directed at specifically
identified potential abuses. In the Revenue Act of 1942,4 Congress
established general guidelines for the design and operation of tax-
qualified pension and profit sharing plans. Rather than attempting
to regulate such plans, however, the 1942 Revenue Act was
designed: (1) to prevent discrimination in favor of officers, share-
holders, supervisors, and highly compensated individuals; and
(2) to protect federal revenues from excessive or unwarranted tax
deductions.5 Congress retained the basic structure established by
the Revenue Act of 1942 in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.6
A second federal enactment affecting the employee benefit area
was the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947.7
That statute imposed restrictions on employee benefit plans for
* Partner, Fitzgerald, Brown, Leahy, Strom, Schorr & Barmettler, Omaha, Ne-
braska; J.D., New York University, 1971.
1. Pens. & Inv. Age, Dec. 7, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
2. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NA-
TIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY, reprinted in, 32 PENS. & PROFrr SHARING
(P-H) 13 (Mar. 6, 1981).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
4. Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798 (1942).
5. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 162, 56 Stat. 862.
6. See IR.C. §§ 401-404 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
7. Pub. L No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
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union employees. Section 302(c) (5)8 of the Act provided that as
long as an employer made employee benefit contributions to a
trust that was jointly administered by union and employer repre-
sentatives and that met certain other requirements, 9 the employer
would not violate the Act's general prohibition against paying any-
thing of value to representatives of his employees.' 0 However, sec-
tion 302(c) (5) only established a framework for the joint
administration by labor and management of pension and welfare
funds. It did not comprehensively regulate the funds, their admin-
istration, or the benefits themselves.
The other significant federal enactment regarding employee
benefit plans prior to 1974 was the Welfare and Pension Plan Dis-
closure Act (WPPDA) enacted by Congress in 1958.11 It contained
certain plan reporting and disclosure requirements and also estab-
lished civil and criminal sanctions for improper use of plan as-
sets. 12 The basic purpose of the WPPDA was to protect employee
benefit plan assets from fraudulent or criminal behavior by forcing
disclosure of the activities of those in charge of the plan and its
assets.13 The Act was not designed to preserve the rights of indi-
vidual participants to those assets.
In 1974 Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA).14 As the Supreme Court has stated, ERISA is
"comprehensive and reticulated."15 The interwoven regulatory
scheme in the Act preempts the entire field of regulation with re-
spect to almost every aspect of employee benefits. 16 Unlike prior
federal regulation, ERISA is directed specifically at the protection
8. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). For a recent decision regarding
the interrelationship between section 302(c) (5) of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at scattered sections of 26
& 29 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), see NLRB v. AMAX Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322
(1981).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
10. The general prohibition is set forth at 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (1976).
11. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1976)).
The WPPDA was repealed by ERISA § Ill(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1031(b) (2)
(1976).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 305-307 (1976).
13. See id. § 301.
14. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified at scattered sections of 26 & 29 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)).
15. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981); Nachman Corp.
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980).
16. Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that ERISA supersedes all state laws "in-
sofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976). See Lederman v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 494 F.
Supp. 1020, 1022 (C.D. Cal. 1980), and infra note 32.
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of employees and the guaranteeing of their benefits. It is a "pro-
employee" act designed to provide a wide variety of safeguards
and minimum standards with respect to the establishment, opera-
tion, and administration of benefit plans.'7 The Act is massive in
both dimension and detail because of the scope of the matters cov-
ered and the specificity with which Congress determined to regu-
late employee benefits.
Title I of ERISA sets forth the basic regulatory framework for
the protection of employee benefit rights.18 It imposes comprehen-
sive reporting and disclosure requirements,19 minimum funding
standards,20 minimum vesting and participation standards,2 1
fiduciary responsibility rules,22 and a system for civil and criminal
enforcement.23 The extent of the coverage of Title I is the subject
of this Article.
II. SCOPE OF TITLE I COVERAGE
Coverage of a particular employee benefit plan by ERISA24 has
several important ramifications. Among the most significant are
the reporting and disclosure requirements 25 and the substantial
civil and criminal penalties for failure to comply,26 but there are
many others.27 For example, in a suit by an employee for plan ben-
efits, ERISA coverage affects procedural matters such as the abil-
17. Fine v. Semet, 514 F. Supp. 34, 41 (S.D. Fla. 1981); 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). ERISA consists of four separate
titles. Title II is primarily concerned with the qualification requirements for
tax-qualified pension and profit sharing plans. ERISA, Pub. L No. 93-406,
§§ 1001-2008, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.
(1976 & Supp. V 1980)). In form it is an amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code. Title MII sets forth procedures to be followed by the Secretaries of
Treasury and Labor in the joint administration of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1242 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Title V establishes a program of plan termina-
tion insurance, the basic purpose of which is to insure payment of vested
benefits to employees covered by defined benefit pension plans. Id. §§ 1301-
1381.
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1976).
20. Id. §§ 1081-1086.
21. Id. §§ 1051-1061.
22. Id. §§ 1101-1114.
23. Id. §§ 1131-1144.
24. See infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
25. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1976).
26. Id. §§ 1131-1141.
27. Some less significant ramifications are the necessity for bonding with a
surety company, id. § 1112; the requirement that the plan be in writing, id.
§ 1102(a) (1), and the necessity for the adoption of a claims procedure for the
plan. Id. § 1133.
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ity to litigate in federal court,28 the recovery of attorneys fees29 and
punitive damages,30 the availability of a jury trial,31 and the pre-
emption of state laws.32 Perhaps of more consequence, ERISA
coverage also affects substantive matters regarding the operation
of the plan itself, such as whether the plan must be funded on a
current basis33 and the duties owed to the employees by the em-
ployer and others with respect to the plan.3 4
The latter requirement can be particularly material. ERISA
has created a new federal system of fiduciary standards and duties
which apply to substantially all covered plans. Many actions re-
specting employee benefit plans, which prior to 1974 were mea-
sured by state contract law principles of reasonableness, are now
simply prohibited.3 5 Moreover, an entirely new federal common
law is to be developed, taking into account the special nature of
28. Id. § 1132(e); Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1980). See infra
note 63.
29. Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 512 (1981) (attorney fees are recoverable). See also San Pedro Fisher-
man's Welfare Trust Fund Local 33 v. Di Bernardo, 664 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir.
1982); National Stabilization Agreement v. Commercial Roofing & Sheet
Metal, 655 F.2d 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
30. Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 102 S. Ct. 512 (1981) (as a matter of federal common law punitive dam-
ages are inappropriate).
31. Compare Wardle v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981) (no jury
trial in suit for plan benefits) with Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Coun-
cil No. 43, 431 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (jury trial available under
ERISA).
32. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976), ERISA supersedes all state laws that "relate
to" employee benefit plans. This has been interpreted by one court to mean
that a pendent claim of tortious interference with employee benefit plans
cannot be made. Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th
Cir.), cent denied, 102 S. Ct. 512 (1981). Another court has concluded that
ERISA does not preempt a pendent claim of fraudulent misrepresentation of
the nature of benefits under a medical plan and a claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress with respect thereto. Provience v. Valley Clerks
Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp. 388, 392 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
The entire area of federal preemption of state law by ERISA has been the
subject of numerous conflicting opinions. Compare Standard Oil Co. of Cali-
fornia v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), and General Split Corp. v.
Mitchell, 523 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Wis. 1981), with Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kra-
marsky, 650 F.2d 1287, vacated on rehearing, 666 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1981), and
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. State of Maryland Comm'n., 520 F. Supp. 539 (D.
Md. 1981). The Supreme Court's recent decision in Alessi v. Raybestos-Man-
hattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981), may clear up some of the confusion in this
area by its holding that the phrase "relate to any employee benefit plan" in 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976) is to be broadly construed.
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1976).
34. Id. §§ 1101-1114.
35. Id. § 1106. See supra note 32.
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employee benefit plans. 36 The current undeveloped nature of this
new common law leaves employers in a state of uncertainty, espe-
cially with respect to their fringe benefit and nonqualified retire-
ment plans37 which, for most employers, were never subject to any
degree of regulation.
Title I applies to employee benefit plans affecting commerce 3 8
that are "established or maintained" by an employer or employee
organization.39 Exempted are the broad categories of governmen-
tal plans,40 church plans,41 and a few enumerated specialized types
of plans.42 The term "employee benefit plan" is divided into two
distinct types of plans-the "employee welfare benefit plan" and
the "employee pension benefit plan."43
Section 3(1) of ERISA broadly defines an "employee welfare
36. In Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 1980), the court stated: "We
note first that in enacting ERISA, Congress intended that a body of Federal
substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving
rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." Likewise, in
Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 635 (W.D. Wis. 1979), the
court stated: "[T] he intent of Congress was to federalize the common law of
trusts applied in view of the special nature and purpose of employee benefit
plans."
37. For a discussion of nonqualified retirement and deferred compensation pro-
grams, see infra text accompanying notes 68-93.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1976). "Commerce" is broadly defined by the statute, id.
§ 1002(11) (1976), as "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communica-
tion between any State and any place outside thereof;" and has been broadly
interpreted by the Department of Labor. See Pension & Welfare Benefit Pro-
gram Op. Let. 77-36, summarized at [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] PENS. PLAN
GUIDE (CCH) 25,304.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1976). The term "employee organization" is defined as
"any labor union or any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee, association, group, or plan, in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning an employee benefit plan, or other matters inci-
dental to employment relationships; or any employees' beneficiary associa-
tion organized for the purpose in whole or in part, of establishing such a
plan." Id. § 1002 (4).
40. Id. § 1003(b) (1). A "governmental plan" is any plan established or main-
tained by any government, political subdivision, or agency or instrumentality
thereof. Id. § 1002(32). It includes plans collectively bargained between a
union and a governmental entity. Pension & Welfare Benefit Program Op.
Let. 79-83, summarized at [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] PENS. PLAN GUIDE
(CCH) 1 25,295.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2) (1976). A church plan is basically a plan established by
a tax-exempt church or convention of churches. Id. § 1002(33).
42. Also excluded from all of ERISA's provisions are workmen's compensation
plans, plans maintained outside the United States for nonresident aliens, and
unfunded plans designed to provide retirement benefits in excess of the lim-
its set forth in section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(b) (3)-(5) (1976).
43. Id. § 1002(3).
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benefit plan" as a "plan, fund, or program" established or main-
tained for the purpose of providing- "(A) medical, surgical, or hos-
pital care benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, appren-
ticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholar-
ship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described
in section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947
.... "44 An "employee pension benefit plan" under section 3(2) of
ERISA is a plan, fund, or program which "provides retirement in-
come to employees" or "results in a deferral of income by employ-
ees extending to the termination of covered employment or
beyond."45
Substantially all of ERISA's Title I provisions extend to pen-
sion plans which are qualified under section 401(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code.46 Practitioners have become well versed in the ap-
.plicability of ERISA to those plans. However, with respect to em-
ployee welfare benefit plans and pension plans which are not tax-
qualified, the extension of ERISA's coverage may lead to unex-
pected results.
ERISA's definition of employee benefit plans is to be broadly
interpreted. One court, noting that "ERISA is a comprehensive re-
medial statute designed to protect the pensions and other benefits
of employees,"47 concluded: "With such a statute, a liberal con-
struction is warranted in order to carry out the statute's remedial
purposes, . . . and coverage should be extended to provide the
maximum degree of protection to employees."4 8 Despite this ex-
pansive rule of interpretation, it is obvious that not all arrange-
ments benefiting employees are covered by ERISA or by all of its
provisions.
UI. EMPLOYEE WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS
The Department of Labor has issued final regulations regarding
the applicability of ERISA to certain types of employment prac-
44. Id. § 1002(1). The reference to the Labor Management Relations Act is made
to include within the definition of welfare benefit plans those plans which
provide holiday and severance benefits and similar benefits. Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, § 302(c), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1976).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976).
46. A tax-qualified plan is basically one for which the contributing employer re-
ceives a current tax deduction for contributions to a trust or insurance annu-
ity contract and the employee defers the reporting of income until funds are
actually received by him from the plan or trust. Detailed and complicated
rules are set forth in the Code regarding the qualification requirements. See
LR.C. §§ 401-415 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).




tices.49 With respect to welfare benefit plans, the regulations make
it clear that ERISA does not apply to what are essentially payroll
practices such as overtime pay, shift premiums, holiday premiums,
and weekend premiums. 50 Also, where payments are made from
the general assets of the employer, the regulations exclude pay-
ments of sick pay, vacation pay, and pay during jury or military
duty.51 A number of practices not specifically within the definition
of a welfare plan are also excepted. These include on-premises
recreation and dining facilities, holiday gifts, remembrance funds,
sales of goods to employees (whether at a discount or at market),
hiring halls, strike funds, and industry advancement programs.52
The regulations make it clear that the listed exceptions from cover-
age are not all-inclusive. 53
Further guidance as to the scope of ERISA coverage has come
in the form of advisory opinions issued from time to time by the
Department of Labor. The Department has expressed its opinion
that payments of holiday and vacation pay benefits from a sepa-
rately maintained fund54 and a death benefit fund accumulating
contributions of union members to pay death benefits5 5 are both
covered welfare benefit plans. It has also opined in conformity
with the above-referenced regulations that an employer's payment
of compensation from its general assets during an employee's sick
leave is not a welfare benefit plan.56
A key requirement for coverage is that the plan, fund, or pro-
gram be "established or maintained" by an employer or employee
organization.5 7 Thus, insurance contracts or funds made available
by organizations to employers and employee organizations are not
themselves employee benefit plans.58 Rather, each employer or
49. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3 (1981).
50. Id. § 2510.3-1(b)(1).
51. Id. § 2510.3-1(b)(2)-(3).
52. Id. § 2510.3-1(c)-(i).
53. Id. § 2510.3-1(a) (4).
54. Pension & Welfare Benefit Program Op. Let. 79-4A, summarized at [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 25,304.
55. Pension & Welfare Benefit Program Op. Let. 79-16, summarized at [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 25,304. Under the plan, each
participating union member contributed $5.00 initially plus an additional $3.00
when a member died. The death benefit equaled $2.65 times the number of
members.
56. Pension & Welfare Benefit Program Op. Let. 80-44A, summarized at [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] PENS. PLAN GUmE (CCH) 25,367. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-
l(b)(2) (1981).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(2) (1976).
58. Taggart Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin. Inc., 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981) (proprietary enterprise offering ability
to small employers to combine together to obtain group insurance rates not
covered by ERISA); Pension & Welfare Benefit Program Op. Let. 78-4A, sum-
[Vol. 61:428
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employee organization funding a plan with an insurance contract
or fund would be establishing its own separate employee welfare
benefit plan.59 Moreover, if the benefit is simply offered by the in-
surer directly to employees, there is no ERISA coverage. 60
The effect of the "established or maintained" requirement can
be clearly seen in the recent case of Lederman v. Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co.61 In that case, an employee brought suit for
health benefits against an insurer who provided benefits under a
group insurance contract with the plaintiff's employer. The in-
surer sought to remove the case to federal court. Since the suit
was not against either the plan, the employer, or any fiduciary of
the plan, and since the contract itself was not a "plan, fund or pro-
gram,"62 the federal court held that the complaint was not subject
to ERISA's civil enforcement provisions and returned the case to
state court.63 The court also rather broadly questioned the general
scope of ERISA coverage when it stated:
I cannot believe that Congress intended that every claim against the in-
surance company under an employer's group health insurance plan
should be a potential item of litigation in federal court. The policy declara-
tion in the first section of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1001) shows that Congress
was concerned about the fairness and financial soundness and stability of
the employee benefit plans that had been increasing so rapidly in size,
marIzed at [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 1 25,304, (le-
gal services program); Pension & Welfare Benefit Program Op. Let. 80-10A,
summarized at [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 1125,341
(prototype health plan). See also Insurance & Prepaid Benefits Trusts v.
Marshall, 90 F.R.D. 703 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
59. Pension & Welfare Benefit Program Op. Let. 80-10A, summarized at [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 1 25,341.
60. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) (1981). The Department of Labor specifically ex-
empts from coverage group or group type insurance programs offered by an
insurer to employees under which: (1) no contributions are made by an em-
ployer or employee organization; (2) participation is completely voluntary;
(3) the sole functions of the employer or employee organization are, without
endorsing the program, to permit the insurer to publicize the program and to
collect premiums and remit them to the insurer and (4) the employer or em-
ployee organization receives no consideration other than reasonable compen-
sation for administrative services. Id.
61. 494 F. Supp. 1020 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)-(2) (1976).
63. 494 F. Supp. at 1023. The court also noted that because state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction of claims for benefits under ERISA (29
U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1) (1976)), the plaintiff should have the choice of forum. Id.
This conclusion is questionable. In McConnell v. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial
Ass'n Benefit Plans, 526 F. Supp. 770 (N.D. Cal. 1981), the court held that
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1976), a defendant has a right to remove to federal
court an action for benefits under ERISA, since such actions are under the
concurrent jurisdiction of the state and federal courts and there is no express




In the context of the case, the court's conclusion was correct since
the claim was made against the insurance company, not the em-
ployer or the plan. On the other hand, the court's implied finding
that claims for employee benefits should not be generally subject
to federal jurisdiction is clearly incorrect. The Act specifically con-
fers federal jurisdiction regarding claims for employee plan bene-
fits,65 and the legislative history of the Act shows that broad
federal jurisdiction over all claims is precisely what Congress in-
tended.66 Moreover, under certain circumstances, suits directly
against insurance companies are permitted under ERISA.67
IV. NONQUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND DEFERRED
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS
In addition to pension and profit sharing plans that are qualified
under the Internal Revenue Code, employers have long provided
to their employees a wide variety of non-tax-qualified deferred
compensation arrangements.68 If such plans are covered by ER-
ISA as "employee pension benefit plans," 69 the results can be dra-
matic. All "employee pension benefit plans" are automatically
subject to the minimum funding standards and vesting standards
of ERISA.70 Consequently, pay-as-you-go7 1 or terminally funded72
64. 494 F. Supp. at 1022.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1976).
66. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 327, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5107, states that suits to enforce benefit rights under
the plan or to recover benefits under the plan "are to be regarded as arising
under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947." See Amato v.
Bernard, 618 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1980), and Chastain v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 496
F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ga. 1980), for examples of decisions involving claims for
benefits under ERISA.
67. Such a suit was involved in Eversole v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 500 F.
Supp. 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1980). In that case, the summary plan description for
the group health insurance plan stated that the insurer was the plan fiduciary
in charge of benefit claims. Based on this provision, the court found that the
insurance company was a fiduciary subject to the provisions of 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1114 (1976) and suit could be brought in federal court directly against
it. 500 F. Supp. at 1166.
68. A non-tax-qualified plan is one which does not meet one or more of the strict
requirements of sections 401-415 of the Internal Revenue Code.
69. See supra text accompanying note 45.
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1081 (1976).
71. Under a pay-as-you-go plan, the employer pays each retired worker's
monthly pension as each payment becomes due. There is no accumulation of
pension funds in a trust or through a contract or policy with an insurance
company. E. ALLEN, J. MELONE, J. ROSENBLOOM, PENSION PLANNING 162-63
(4th ed. 1981).
72. Under a terminal funding approach, the employer sets aside for each em-
[Vol. 61:428
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plans are not permitted under ERISA.
Many pay-as-you-go or terminally funded plans existed prior to
the enactment of ERISA. Pursuant to their terms employers
would pay retirement benefits, often on an ad hoc basis only, to
employees who actually retired at a normal retirement date or had
completed a long period of service. Often an employer established
such a plan solely to provide a supplement to profit sharing bene-
fits for older employees who did not have sufficient participation in
the qualified profit sharing plan to accumulate an adequate retire-
ment benefit. Employees who terminated prior to retirement or
prior to the required length of employment would receive nothing
under such plans. Other arrangements were no more than gratui-
ties paid to retiring employees. ERISA's funding and vesting re-
quirements essentially eliminated all of these plans.73
Additionally, by requiring that all pension plans be funded, ER-
ISA has a substantial negative income tax effect on participants in
nonqualified deferred compensation plans. Under applicable tax
rules, a participant in a nonqualified funded deferred compensa-
tion plan must report employer contributions as income when his
interest under the plan becomes vested.74 Requiring funding of
such plans thus, unfortunately, also requires employees to pay
taxes on funds they will possibly not receive for many years.
Not all deferred compensation plans must be funded. ERISA
makes an important exception to the vesting, participation, fund-
ing, and fiduciary responsibility rules for "unfunded" plans main-
tained by an employer "primarily for the purpose of providing
deferred compensation for a select group of management or highly
compensated employees." 75 Presumably Congress created this ex-
ception since managerial and highly compensated employees have
more opportunity to fend for themselves in protecting their rights
to benefits. The exception is important, as it allows employers to
grant key employees equity plans such as incentive and nonquali-
fled stock options, phantom stock plans, and performance share
plans.76 Such plans and similar ones are often key factors in the
attraction and retention of executives.
ployee on his retirement date a lump sum amount sufficient to provide the
monthly pension benefit promised. As under the pay-as-you-go approach,
terminal funding does not require the employer to make any contributions on
behalf of employees who are still actively at work. Id. at 163.
73. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(e) (1981).
74. See L.C. § 402(b) (1981); 26 C.F.L § 402(b) (1) (1981); L.&C. § 403(c) (1981);
26 C.F.R. § 403(c) (1) (1981).
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a) (3), 1101(a) (1) (1976).
76. See Wingfield, "Equity" Type Compensation Arrangements: A Comparative




Availability of the exception depends on the definition of two
terms--"unfunded" and "highly compensated." The term "un-
funded" is not defined by ERISA but has a well-established mean-
ing in the employee benefits area, primarily deriving from the tax
law interpretation of the term. To speak of a "funded" plan basi-
cally is to refer to a nonqualified plan under which the deferred
compensation is irrevocably contributed by the employer to a sep-
arate fund, e.g., a trust, a group annuity contract, or an escrow ac-
count.7 7 The key element is that the employer cannot recoup its
contribution. The individual employee may forfeit his right to his
portion of the fund which will be distributed among other partici-
pants,78 but the employer cannot recover its contribution.
An "unfunded" deferred compensation plan is any plan not
funded in the above sense. With an unfunded plan, an employer
may or may not accumulate funds to meet future obligations in
some funding vehicle, such as an insurance contract. Neverthe-
less, the employees have nothing more than the unsecured prom-
ise of their employer to pay them at a later date. If the deferred
compensation is in fact set aside or invested by the employer, the
employees have no legal right to the fund. This definition of "un-
funded" has been applied for many years by the Internal Revenue
Service in issuing rulings regarding the taxability of benefits paya-
ble to participants under deferred compensation plans.79
The foregoing definition of "unfunded" has also been applied
under ERISA in an unreported decision. In Butcher & Singer, Inc.
v. Johnson,80 the court denied cross motions for summary judg-
ment on the question of ERISA coverage. At issue was a deferred
compensation plan pursuant to which the employer was accumu-
lating assets in a fund with a brokerage firm. The plan provided
that employees had a claim only against the general assets of the
corporation and that the fund was subject to the general claims of
77. Butcher & Singer, Inc. v. Johnson, No. 78-3960 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1979), summa-
rized at [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) % 22,282.
78. The circumstances under which such a forfeiture would occur would be spec-
ified in the applicable plan, e.g., an employee's termination before a specified
number of years of service or retirement.
79. See Rev. Rul. 72-25, 1972-1 C.B. 127; Rev. Rul 68-99, 1968-1 C.B. 193. Pursuant
to Rev. Proc. 71-19, 1971-1 C.B. 698, the Internal Revenue Service regularly
grants advance rulings as to the tax consequences of "unfunded deferred
compensation plans." Favorable rulings have been issued on several occa-
sions to plans where insurance has been purchased to help the employer
meet its liabilities under the plan but where the insurance policy or contract
remains an asset of the employer subject to the claims of general creditors.
See, e.g., Priv. Let. Rul. 8134067 (May 27, 1981); Priv. Let. Rul. 8028104 (Apr. 21,
1980).
80. No. 78-3960 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 1979), summarized at [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] PENS. PLAN GumS (CCH) $ 22,282.
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creditors. The employee claimed that this provision was simply in-
cluded in the plan as a formality for tax purposes and was not re-
ally intended. The court held that the question of whether the plan
was funded or unfunded depended on whether the employer had
the right to use the funds in the ordinary course of its business, a
question to be resolved through a trial on the merits.81
ERISA fails also to define the term "highly compensated." Pre-
sumably, a determination of whether an employee is "highly com-
pensated" will vary from employer to employer depending on the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. Some guidance can
be found in the Department of Labor advisory opinions, however.
In one 1975 opinion, the Department found that the exception ap-
plied to a plan for employees earning at least $18,200 per year who
were exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act as administrative,
supervisory, or professional employees. 82 In a second 1975 opinion,
a plan was also found exempt where it limited participation to 115
employees who comprised less than 4% of the employer's work
force and received average compensation in excess of $28,000, as
compared to a $19,000 average for all company management
employees. 83
Three more types of deferred compensation arrangements pos-
sibly fitting within ERISA's coverage of employee pension benefit
plans deserve comment. These are bonus programs, severance
pay arrangements, and individual employment agreements provid-
ing for deferred compensation.
Labor Department regulations specifically exempt from the
pension plan definition bonus payments for work performed "un-
less such payments are systematically deferred to the termination
of covered employment or beyond, so as to provide retirement in-
come to employees." 84 The scope of this exemption was involved
in Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co.,85 where the employer paid merit bo-
nuses to employees during employment in the form of fractional
interests in mineral properties. The suit was for breach of fiduci-
ary duties. The plaintiff claimed that the plan was a pension plan
covered by ERISA since participation in the plan and payments
thereunder continued beyond the termination of employment, for
81. Id.
82. Pension & Welfare Benefit Program Op. Let. 75-63, summarized at 4 PENS.
PLAN GUIDE (CCH) $ 25,136 (1976).
83. Pension & Welfare Benefit Program Op. Let. 75-64, summarized at 4 PENSION
PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 25,136 (1976). LR.C. § 401(k) (4) (Supp. IV 1980) defines
a "highly compensated employee" for purposes of a qualified cash or deferred
plan as an employee more highly compensated than two-thirds of the em-
ployer's employees.
84. 29 C.F. § 2510.3-2(c) (1981).
85. 611 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1980).
1982]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
as long as the mineral interest was producing and generating roy-
alties. The court rejected such reasoning, holding that ERISA cov-
erage depended upon whether the plan was designed for the
purpose of paying current compensation or retirement income.86
A recent advisory opinion makes it far from certain whether the
Department of Labor would reach the -same conclusion as the
court in the Murphy case.87
Since severance pay continues compensation beyond the termi-
nation of employment, a practice of making severance payments to
employees technically fits within the definition of a "pension plan"
under ERISA.88 To avoid unneeded regulation of many of such
plans, the Department of Labor regulations provide that severance
pay plans are not pension plans provided: (1) the payments are
not contingent upon the employee's retiring, (2) the total sever-
ance payments do not exceed twice the employee's annual com-
pensation, and (3) the payments are terminated generally within a
period of twenty-four months after termination. 89
An individual employment contract requiring a single employee
to furnish specific personal services would not normally be a "plan,
fund, or program" covered by ERISA even if it provided for pay-
ments beyond the termination of employment.90 Such a contract
86. The court held with respect to ERISA:
Its words are not to be read as an elastic girdle that can be stretched
to cover any content that can conceivably fit within its reach. Any
outright conveyance of property to an employee might result in some
payment to him after retirement. The words "provides retirement in-
come" patently refer only to plans designed for the purpose of paying
retirement income whether as a result of their express terms or sur-
rounding circumstances.
Id. at 575 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976)).
87. In Pension & Welfare Benefit Program Op. Let. 80-29A, summarized at [1979-
1981 Transfer Binder] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) T 25,363, the Labor Depart-
ment gave its opinion with respect to a plan which distributed stock each
year to employees. The employees were vested in 20% of the distributed
stock each year and, upon separation from service prior to retirement, the
shares had to be returned to the company. Since vesting in certain shares did
not occur until after retirement, the Department determined that the plan
could provide retirement income or result in the deferral of income. Conse-
quently, the plan was a pension plan covered by ERISA.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (1976). See supra text accompanying note 45.
89. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(b) (1981). It should be noted that even though severance
pay plans are not pension plans, they do fall within the specific definition of
employee welfare benefit plans under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976). See supra
text accompanying note 44. The Department of Labor specifically noted the
coverage of severance pay plans as welfare plans in its March 2, 1979 pream-
ble to the regulations. 44 Fed. Reg. 11763 (1979).
90. The definitions of both welfare and pension plans specifically contemplate a
program for more than one employee. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(2) (1976). But cf.
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b) (1981) (stating that a Keogh plan for a sole proprietor
and one common-law employee is a plan covered by ERISA).
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was involved in Jervis v. Elerding.9' In that case, the employment
agreement required the employer to provide rent-free use of an
apartment to an employee after termination of employment. Rely-
ing on certain advisory opinions of the Department of Labor, the
court held that this post-termination, in-kind compensation was
not a "plan, fund, or program."92 On the other hand, if several indi-
vidual employment contracts are entered into pursuant to some
unified plan or scheme providing deferred compensation, a pen-
sion plan subject to ERISA coverage is established.93
V. DEPENDAHL V. FALSTAFF BREWING CORP.
One recent case from the Eighth Circuit concerning the cover-
age of ERISA deserves special comment. In Dependahl v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp.,9 4 suit was brought by three terminated executives
claiming violations of ERISA. The factual background of the suit is
as follows. In 1974 Falstaff was in severe financial difficulty and
was in need of new capital. It approached an individual, Paul Kal-
manovitz, who agreed to invest $10 million in preferred stock and
to guarantee $10 million of Falstaff debt in exchange for voting con-
trol of the corporation. Upon taking control, Kalmanovitz caused
the firing of several management employees and took actions to
deprive the discharged employees of severance pay and death ben-
efits. In anticipation of the firings, the corporation amended the
eligibility requirements of the severance pay plan so as to exclude
employees who had not worked for a minimum period of fifteen
years. The lower court held that the severance pay plan was an
"employee welfare benefit plan" under ERISA and that the em-
ployees were entitled to severance benefits. 95 The reason given by
the court for ordering the payment of benefits was that, in amend-
ing the plan, Falstaff had breached its fiduciary duty to act solely in
the interests of participants. 96 It had acted, rather, in its own
interests.
There is no question that the severance pay plan was an em-
ployee welfare benefit plan under ERISA and that the fiduciaries
91. 504 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
92. Id. at 608.
93. Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (E.D. Mo. 1980),
affd, 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 512 (1981).
94. 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 512 (1981).
95. 491 F. Supp. at 1196. The lower court had earlier reached this conclusion in a
decision on defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. Calhoun v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357, 361 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
96. 491 F. Supp. at 1197. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1976) provides in relevant part: "[A]
fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the inter-
est of the participants and beneficiaries and-(a) for the exclusive purpose
of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries ......
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with respect to the plan were subject to the fiduciary standards of
ERISA. Whether Falstaff was acting as a fiduciary when it
amended the plan may be open to some question. The adoption,
amendment, and termination of benefit plans seem to be matters
where employers properly can and should act in their own inter-
ests. The district court seemed to recognize the problem created
by its analysis when it made the following somewhat confusing
statement: "This decision does not mean that an employer may
never cut back on benefits previously provided to employees. This
Court merely holds that such a change is not permissible when
made expressly in contemplation of actions which would other-
wise entitle employees to the previously provided benefits."9 7
Seemingly, most employer actions that cut back benefits are in
contemplation of events or actions which would entitle employees
to benefits. A perhaps better statement of the standard to apply in
such cases can be found in the recent First Circuit decision of
Palino v. Casey.9 8 There the joint board of trustees of a Taft-Hart-
ley fund cut back welfare fund benefits and were sued for breach
of fiduciary duties under ERISA. The court noted that trustees of
funds often modify a fund's terms and operations in light of chang-
ing financial conditions and economic considerations. The test for-
mulated by the First Circuit was whether the actions of the
trustees were "arbitrary and capricious" or violated standards of
"fundamental fairness." 99 Had the court in Dependahl used the
standard articulated in Palino, it would have had a strong factual
basis for reaching the same result, and its opinion would have
been better reasoned.100
Another holding of the lower court in Dependahl which was af-
firmed by the Eighth Circuit regarded Falstaff's termination of the
death benefit plan for the fired executives. The court's ruling with
respect to that plan highlights some of the effects of the scope of
ERISA's Title I coverage. In 1972 Falstaff had adopted a plan for
approximately twelve executives which provided for payment of
97. 491 F. Supp. at 1197.
98. 664 F.2d 854 (lst Cir. 1981).
99. Id. at 858-59.
100. The district court found that Kalmanovitz's actions on behalf of Falstaff
"were taken maliciously and unjustiflably" and that "[t] hroughout this litiga-
tion, Kalmanovitz has shown nothing but contempt for the welfare and rights
of plaintiffs, as well as for normal rules of procedure and ethics in this Court."
491 F. Supp. at 1198.
An alternative approach would have been to characterize the plaintiffs'
claim as one for plan benefits, rather than a breach of a fiduciary duty, and
hold that the severance pay policy contained an implied contractual condi-
tion that Falstaff would not terminate the plan when severance was contem-
plated or had already been decided upon. In either event the court's ultimate
decision regarding the payment of severance pay would have been the same.
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annuity income benefits to named beneficiaries upon the execu-
tive's death. If a participant were terminated for cause, he would
forfeit this benefit. Falstaff purchased whole life insurance poli-
cies on the lives of each covered executive to fund the benefits.
From time to time Falstaff had borrowed on the cash value of the
policies to pay the premiums. When Falstaff fired the executives,
it determined not to continue the death benefit plan for them. The
plaintiff executives requested declaratory and injunctive relief
with respect to this plan. The lower court held that the fired execu-
tives continued to be covered by the plan, that Falstaff had to con-
tinue to hold (and presumably pay premiums on) the whole life
insurance contracts, and that no borrowing of cash values would
be permitted since such borrowing would constitute a prohibited
transaction under ERISA.O1
The rationale of the district court's holding was either far too
broadly stated or based on the incorrect conclusion that the death
benefit plan was a "funded" welfare benefit plan with the life in-
surance policies constituting assets of the plan. The plan clearly
was an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA since it was a
plan to provide death benefits.102 However, on the facts set forth in
the opinion, whether it was a "funded" plan is certainly open to
considerable question. 0 3
The lower court found that section 104(a) (3) of ERISA1o4 al-
lowed the Secretary of Labor to exempt certain welfare plans from
the reporting and disclosure requirements of the Act. Accordingly,
29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-24105 provided an exemption for unfunded or
insured welfare plans for a select group of management or highly
compensated employees. Finding the death benefit plan within
the exemption, the lower court concluded: "The fact that the CBS
Plan is exempted from this part of ERISA necessarily implies that
it is otherwise included within the Act's coverage."' 0 6 This finding
overlooks the fact that section 201(a) (1) of the ActlO7 specifically
exempts welfare plans from participation and vesting require-
ments, and that section 301(a) (1) of the ActlO8 specifically exempts
welfare plans from the funding requirements.
Relying on the same regulation, the lower court then concluded
"unfunded" meant that benefits were to be paid from the com-
101. Id. at 1195-96.
102. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976). See supra text accompanying note 44.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a) (3) (1976).
105. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-24 (1981).
106. 491 F. Supp. at 1195.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976).
108. Id. § 1081.
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pany's general assets.109 Since "Falstaff has allowed the insurance
companies to accumulate a fund for the eventual payment of bene-
fits," the court reasoned, benefits could not be paid from general
assets and thus the plan was "funded."10
The Eighth Circuit took that rationale a step further and held:
We agree with the district court's conclusion that the plan was funded.
Funding implies the existence of a res separate from the ordinary assets of
the corporation. All whole-life insurance policies which have a cash value
with premiums paid in part by corporate contributions to an insurance
firm are funded plans. The employee may look to a res separate from the
corporation in the event the contingency occurs which triggers the liabil-
ity of the plan.111
If such a holding were correct, the use of insurance as a funding
vehicle for fringe benefit plans and deferred compensation plans
for the highly compensated would lose all of its attraction. The ad-
verse tax effects on participants in such plans would be substan-
tial.112 As discussed previously,113 however, whether an employee
benefit plan is funded depends upon whether the assets are irrevo-
cably contributed by the employer to a separate fund, e.g., a trust,
a group annuity contract, or an escrow account. On the other
hand, if the assets of the plan, life insurance contracts or other-
wise, are subject to the claims of general creditors, the plan is un-
funded.114 The rationale of the decision in Dependahl was clearly
too broadly stated and probably incorrect.
A recent advisory opinion issued by the Department of Labor
indicates little inclination on the part of the government to follow
the decision in Dependahl regarding the interpretation of a
"funded" plan.115 In the advisory opinion, the Department found
that life insurance policies which constituted a vehicle to accumu-
late assets for a death benefit plan were not assets of the plan. The
terms of the plan carefully explained that employees had no direct
interest in the life insurance policies. The opinion explained the
plan provisions as follows:
The insurance proceeds would be payable only to the corporation, which
would be named as beneficary. The corporation would have all rights of
ownership under the policies, which would be subject to the claims of the
corporation's creditors. Neither the plan nor any participant or benefici-
ary would have any preferred claim against the policies or any beneficial
ownership interest in the policies. There would be no representation to
any participant or beneficiary that the policies will be used only to provide
109. 491 F. Supp. at 1195.
110. Id.
111. 653 F.2d at 1214 (emphasis added).
112. See supra text accompanying note 74.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
114. See id.




plan benefits and the plan benefits would not be limited or governed in
any way by the amount of the insurance proceeds received by the
corporation.
1 1 6
Of course, if the life insurance policies do not constitute plan
assets, no fiduciary duties are owed with respect to holding the pol-
icies, and clearly they can be cancelled, transferred, or borrowed
against without regard to the prohibited transaction rules of ER-
ISA.117 Nevertheless, in view of the confusing decision by the
Eighth Circuit in Dependahl, practitioners would be prudent to in-
corporate the quoted provisions of the advisory opinion in both un-
funded welfare and pension benefit plans where life insurance is
used to cover potential liabilities.
VI. CONCLUSION
As more court decisions, regulations, rulings, and advisory
opinions are issued on the subject, the breadth of ERISA's cover-
age and the impact such coverage can have on the rights and reme-
dies of employers and employees is becoming more and more
apparent. In drafting plans of all types, practitioners must be
aware of the expansive scope of ERISA's coverage and the poten-
tial pitfalls, new liabilities, and new responsibilities imposed by
that coverage.
116. Id.
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1976).
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